An interview with Aleksandr Dugin for Hypermedia Magazine. Mr. Dugin is a sociologist, philosopher, and geopolitical advisor to the General Staff of the Russian Army. Known as ‘Putin’s Rasputin’ or ‘Putin’s Mind,’ for many, he is also the intelligence behind Vladimir Putin’s foreign policy.
I was reading The Future Is History: How Totalitarianism Reclaimed Russia, an excellent book by journalist Masha Gessen. Then I learned from Granma that the newly appointed Cuban president Miguel Díaz-Canel was starting his first international tour as president.
Granma —sparse and owner of a painful syntax— reported that the new president was already in Russia. From Moscow, he’d be traveling to North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos. Nothing less.
Masha Gessen’s story spans from Gorbachev’s years at the head of the Soviet Union to Putin’s Russia, now in 2017. It is constructed from the experiences of seven real characters: three who were already adults during the perestroika years and four who developed their lives after the collapse of the Union.
One of these characters is Aleksandr Dugin (Moscow, 1962), and today he is the leading theorist and international promoter of two interrelated geopolitical concepts: Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory.
The first seeks to restore to today’s Russia its imperial configuration, if not geographically -which is also true- then as a cultural entity. Thus, contributing to constructing a more multipolar world whose blocs would serve as a counterweight to the West and give Eurasia more significant influence in global affairs.
The other, the Fourth Political Theory, “is born of the ideological fusion between the radical communist left and the radical nationalist right, transversed by their common anti-liberalism, together with certain traditionalist expressions”. I read in issue 70 of the journal Elements; Metapolitics for a European Civilization, that Fourth Political Theory advocates the elaboration of a new alternative on the following basis: “The three main modern political ideologies (liberalism/capitalism, communism/socialism, fascism / national socialism) [have failed] and are no longer adequate, so we have to discard them all”.
In her description of Dugin, Masha Gessen shows us a young man recently expelled from the Aviation Institute for his political views. At the time, Dugin recognizes himself as a “dissident hostile to communism”, despite his family being well integrated into the Soviet social mechanism. “His father, who had studied engineering, worked for the KGB in a secret but unglamorous facility. His mother was an official in the Ministry of Health. His grandmother was one of the deans of the Higher Party School”, Gessen recalls.
During this time, he meets Eugenia Debrianskaia, a thirty-year-old single mother, later to become an LGBT activist, with whom he will live for a while and have a son: Artur (after Rimbaud). Dugin is interested in reading traditionalist thinkers, such as Julius Evola, René Guenon, and, significantly, Martin Heidegger —censored in the Soviet Union— of whom he has obtained a microfilm copy of Being and Time.
“Since he did not own a microfilm reader, he made himself a Soviet-style slide projector —a household device for thirty-five-millimeter film, showing cartoons or short films, and operated by a hand crank— to project the book on his work table. By the time he finished reading Being and Time, Dugin needed glasses, but he already knew the text on which he would base his thinking and the rest of his life”.
Coincidentally, while I was reading Masha Gessen, the Granma newspaper was concluding its brief and illegible notes on Miguel Díaz-Canel’s Eurasian tour. At the same time, the Spanish newspaper El Confidencial published a column entitled “Tenebrous Dugin, the mastermind inspiring the global far-right” by journalist Ramón González Férriz.
Using Emmanuel Carrère’s description of Dugin in his book Limonov —Aleksandr Dugin was the founder of the National-Bolshevik Party together with Eduard Limonov and the musician Yegor Letov— the journalist presents him as one of those young “intellectual fascists” who abounded in the underground cultural scene during Yeltsin’s term of office: “Feverish, haggard, awkward, but well-read young men (…); they wandered around with large school bags and gathered in small esoteric bookstores, developing nebulous theories about the Templars, Eurasia or the Rosicrucians. They often ended up converting to Islam”.
However, Carrère points out: “Dugin is that kind of fascist, only he is not a clumsy and sickly young man, but an ogre. He is big, bearded, hairy, walks with the light steps of a dancer, and has a curious way of balancing on one leg. He speaks fifteen languages, has read everything, drinks alcohol dry, has a genuine laugh, and is a mountain of knowledge and charm”.
In González Férriz’s article, the intention to demonize Dugin and to intervene, by dint of scares, in the voting intentions of Spanish readers is evident. “The threat is there and can serve to fuel marginal parties, facilitate their entry into the institutions or, previously decaffeinated, reach even more”, he writes. He pretends to be talking about Dugin, but he is talking about Vox, no doubt.
Who, then, was Aleksandr Dugin? The young polyglot intellectual who, in 1985, just after Mikhail Gorbachev’s perestroika had been proclaimed, announced the end of the Soviet Union? Or was he the gloomy intellectual that González Férriz makes responsible for the ideological restructuring of the European right?
Possibly both, so I decided to find out:
Director of the Department of Sociology at Moscow University, author of more than 60 titles —widely translated—, the leading theoretician of Eurasianism and the Fourth Political Theory, Aleksandr Dugin is also, for many, the ideologue behind the foreign policy of today’s Russia, as well as one of the advisors on geopolitics to the Russian army high command. He is often called —I read— “Putin’s Rasputin” or “Putin’s Mind”.
At that moment, Miguel Díaz-Canel’s trip to Russia and Asia took on a special meaning for me.
Why was the president of a Caribbean country, whose main trading partners are Canada, Spain, Venezuela, and Mexico, choosing such “exotic” destinations for his first international tour?
Could it be that most of the media are misinformed, and it is in Eurasia, in Aleksandr Dugin’s zone of influence, where Cuba’s real interests still lie?
What had Miguel Díaz-Canel gone to look for in places so distant from our commercial and political context? Loans? Investments? Accountability?
I relied on a couple of friends who usually have the most unexpected contacts. I asked them: Do you know Aleksandr Dugin? Both had heard of him, but only one had his email address. He sent it to me attached to a terse message: “Extremely busy, but very cordial”.
“Friendly”, I repeated as I drafted the text I would send with an interview proposal on his work. I also specified I wanted to know his opinion on the role of Cuba regarding Russia, China, and Eurasia being redesigned from the already blurred map of the Soviet Union.
I sent the message and forgot about Dugin for a while. A week later, I received this brief reply: “Excellent”.
By then, I had read a couple of his books, including The Fourth Political Theory, and learned a little more about his life, education, and political evolution. He has a doctorate in Sociology and Philosophy, multiple publishing projects, and held a standing position at the forefront of geopolitical and strategic studies in Russia. But he had obtained barely 1% of votes in St. Petersburg with his National-Bolshevik Party.
Besides, I knew Dugin had desisted from protesting against his description on Wikipedia, convinced, as he said, that any correction he could make would bring other “wikiliberals” to falsify it; there was nothing to be done.
For Aleksandr Dugin, liberalism is the main enemy. And once you assume you have an enemy, the rest is war.
However, I also realized that in this position that radically confronted him with the United States -the most remarkable historical incarnation of liberalism-, Dugin made a couple of exceptions: from the American political cosmos, he appreciated Donald J. Trump and, above all, Steve Bannon, with whom he shares more than one ideological postulate and many readings.
So, I took it upon myself to put together a questionnaire that would try to investigate not only the aspects related to the geopolitical role of the Cuban government but also the figure of Aleksandr Dugin and his intellectual work. And I sent it to him. There were twenty-two questions, so it would surely take him some time to answer them, I thought. And I hit the send button. To my surprise, minutes later, he sent me back a message from his cell phone: “Let’s talk on Skype. Impossible to answer the questionnaire now”.
When? I asked.
“Today at 2:00 pm. Moscow time”.
But what time was it in Moscow?
As it turned out, Aleksandr Dugin was scheduling me for an hour later; he didn’t care where I might be. It would be a Skype call that I would have to record – he would do it too – and for which he needed a good Internet connection and, above all, silence. But I was on the road, on vacation with my six-year-old son, and my six-year-old son was willing to accept anything but me giving up some of his time to a Russian sociologist. Let’s put it this way, Aleksandr Dugin, the man advocating a multipolar world that would stand up to Western liberalism, was not in my son’s liberal plans.
What was to be done then? I had an hour barely to organize everything. I called a friend who lived nearby: I needed two big favors. One: the silence of her house. Two: for her to babysit while I taped an interview. Was it possible?
It was. What follows is the result of that conversation. A talk about his life, his intellectual formation; his vision of Cuba’s role in Eurasia and Latin America, as well as in the United States; the arrival of Donald J. Trump to the U.S. presidency; Steve Bannon, and, of course, his Fourth Political Theory.
Before giving way to the transcript, I would like to publicly thank Aleksandr Dugin for his kindness in granting me this interview for Hypermedia Magazine; to P. C. for his complicity in carrying it out; and my son D. A. for the generosity of giving up part of our time to a stranger. Thank you very much to all three of you. I remain in your debt.
The conversation (introduction)
“You will forgive me if I do not answer your questionnaire”, said Aleksandr Dugin. “It would be too long to tell the story of my life in an interview. In any case, I quote Julius Evola, ‘my biography is my bibliography’”.
I understand that. But, somehow, I must introduce you to our readers. Many, indeed, have not read his books, and I would like them to know him through his portrait.
I agree. Let us review what you call “my life”, he said. From my youth, I was a dissident of the communist regime. I dissented because I did not think like them or believe in the dogmas of Marxist philosophy. My family was typical, pro-Soviet, but I disagreed with them, and somehow, that break served to start my intellectual path. An anti-communist and anti-liberal approach at the same time. Then, I read traditionalist authors such as René Guenon and Julius Evola. I thought these authors had an anti-modernist look, both liberal and communist, given to materialism and the concept of modernity. And then, I discovered that the truth was to be found precisely in opposition to the modern world.
From that starting point, I distanced myself from the Soviet context and began to study in a self-taught way. I was not interested in continuing studies at the Institute of Aeronautics, as I already believed that the essential thing for me was to concentrate above all on the studies of tradition and religion and the philosophy that it was impossible to learn through the paths of Soviet education. Those readings formed me as a dissident but a right-wing dissident, for I was not a liberal dissident like most. I was a right-wing dissident: traditionalist, illiberal, anti-Western, and anti-Soviet.
I spent my youth studying and self-preparing: philosophy and foreign languages (English, French, German). I studied the prominent authors of traditionalism, which led me to a particular interest in Martin Heidegger and, from him, in the German conservative revolution and anti-modern and conservative authors.
I was expelled from the Institute of Aeronautics. I was very young and openly contradicted the Soviet professors and their dogmas. This behavior, of course, caused me problems, but, at the same time, it allowed me to concentrate on continuing my studies independently.
When perestroika began, I became involved in alternative political life and joined the political movements that emerged in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s. At the same time, I started teaching informally. I taught courses on tradition, religion, philosophy, and geopolitics.
My vocation led me at that time to delve into authors and studies devoted to geopolitics, especially Carl Schmitt. But I also focused my interest on the Russian tradition and Eurasianist studies. When the Soviet Union fell, at that very moment, I was already prepared to offer an alternative to liberalism and communism.
The censorship disappeared, so I was able to find the weekly Den (The Day) and began to publish my first articles. At the same time, I began teaching geopolitics to Russian politicians and military officers. I introduced geopolitics to the General Staff because the Russian generals realized that, contrary to what might be expected, NATO continued to be a threat after the fall of the Soviet Union, even if it was no longer through the ideological vision of the socialist camp against the capitalist camp.
Russia had lost its ideology, but the threat still existed. The Russian military needed to understand this fact. I made them aware of a fundamental factor in understanding the correlation between land power and sea power in the war of the continents, in the battle of Anglo-Saxon politics against the non-liberal world.
From that moment on, I published articles and books that found translations. I host my radio program and develop the Eurasian Course. It was the 1990s. At that time, I opposed Boris Yeltsin, whose liberal ideology was contrary to my traditionalist views.
I returned to the university and conducted my ideas through academic thought, allowing me to develop a theoretical discourse for geopolitics and philosophy. I graduated and soon after did a Ph.D. in Sociology and another in Political Philosophy. Later, I began to head the Sociology Department of Lomonosov Moscow State University.
Let’s say that, with maturity, I managed to unify the interests of the autodidact I was as a young man with university studies and academic discourse. All these things allowed me to shape my thinking and deepen my understanding of Eurasianist ideas. Besides, I developed these ideas as a movement, a kind of think tank, and collaborated with some Kremlin circles.
On the political level, my support for Vladimir Putin is due to a simple factor: Putin is a patriot, a conservative, a realist, and not a communist. Which, generally speaking, corresponds to my ideals.
To sum up: to date, I have published more than 60 books, many of which have been translated; I give lectures, write articles, and so on. I hope that all this will serve to make me known to the readers of Hypermedia Magazine. I think, and don’t take this wrong, that ideas are more important than individuals. It would be more enjoyable for me to talk about concepts, theories, strategies, and history. My individuality is worthless in front of my philosophy.
Thank you very much for your presentation. Speaking already of theories: once Mikhail Gorbachev announced perestroika, aimed at improving the Soviet system, you advance that it was the end of the USSR. Why?
Like the Eurasianists of the 1920s and 1930s, when these ideas took definitive shape, I thought it necessary to establish a difference between the concept of the Soviet Union and that of Russian civilization. I was never in favor of the state as a civilization. Eurasian Russia is a form of organization of many peoples in a historical and cultural whole.
I believed this civilization’s status had to be saved, not in the traditional state, but the form of an empire. And, at the same time, to take the social factor of the concept of the Union.
I was opposed to capitalism, liberalism, and globalization because I understand that they are perverse and decadent forms of civilization. But I was also opposed to communism because of its worldly interest and atheistic doctrine. It was not just me. Many conservative communists of the 1980s and 1990s shared the same view. Socialism was a positive factor, as was the organic, natural, pre-Communist organization of the Soviet Union. And that organization and those social values were to be saved as long as, as I said, we eliminated the materialistic, atheistic, and progressive dogma of Soviet ideology.
After Gorbachev’s presidency, the situation of the concept of Russia as Eurasia was critical. The pro-Western liberals had won, and this victory did not allow the conservative communists to save the Russian state-civilization. Therefore, faced with this advantage, the pro-Western liberals set about destroying the traditional concept of the Soviet Union, starting with its social system. At the same time, they began to destroy Russia.
Fortunately, Putin has saved that situation. Putin rejects liberalism, and we must be aware that liberalism kills identitarian sovereign states. Liberalism is the mortal enemy of all sovereignties and all identities because it defends a global program centered on the individual and not on communities. Liberalism is the number one enemy of all those who believe in sovereignty and identity.
Cuba is in the process of changing course. The end of the Castro era means, whether we want it or not, a generational change and, therefore, another way of articulating ideology. Would there be parallels between the final years of the Soviet Union and today’s Cuba?
Of course, and I would like to establish an equivalent. Suppose that Cuba, right now, is in the final years of the Soviet Union under Gorbachev: it has before it a great dilemma. On the one hand, the liberal option, and on the other hand, what seems likely to happen. A course which, without entering fully into the capitalist world, eliminates from the system due to lack of resources or ideology, the socialist element, and social justice.
I know it is a complex decision, and its implementation is even more so. But we have paid the price, and in the long run, we can see how difficult it is to restore sovereignty and a social equity policy. Cuba should not repeat Gorbachev’s fatal step of destroying the best aspects of socialism. Nor should it compromise its independence.
The traditional communist country that Cuba is today can become another country with better prospects for economic development, not necessarily at odds with the United States. Both nations are worlds and cultures apart. The United States represents the North American civilization, and Cuba belongs to the Catholic, Latin civilization of Hispanic heritage. This difference means that Cuba can play a crucial role in awakening a shared consciousness and identity in Latin America.
This approach should be the form of Cuban perestroika: forget Marxist, dogmatic materialism and focus on saving its sovereignty, preserving social justice, and its identity as a nation.
China, for example, has studied the Soviet experience very well, intending to avoid repeating our mistakes. I think that the Chinese model and Putin’s model, both multipolar, are essential to Cuba’s future. As are the models developed based on populism, which would allow the country not to be forced to accept the liberal truth of the United States.
The United States, its philosophy, is not the solution: it is a problem. It would be more convenient for Cuba to focus on its development model and not enter fully into the complex world of the United States.
But what could that model be?
Cuba must remain independent of the United States, but, at the same time, it must continue to eliminate any Marxist concepts from its identity as a nation. Marxism is a doctrine that does not correspond to any valid social truth, for it is nothing but a form of materialism and modernity. And modernity destroys traditional identities and the spirit of people.
If there is something to be saved from the current Cuban project, it is, as I have said, its sovereignty, its national identity, and its aspirations for social justice.
It so happens that the Cuban problem, essentially, is that we are two countries. Or at least two societies. There is one country on the island and another in exile. It is a situation that has lasted more than sixty years. And in exile, most of us are opponents of the communist regime imposed on the island. How do we merge these two realities in a single national project?
I believe that both scenarios represent false visions. Both the dogmatic continuation of Marxist communism and the change of course towards a liberal policy.
We must begin by uniting the people: Cubans living in the United States and Cubans living on the island. And propose a third solution: sovereignty, a particular identity that does not coincide with Western liberalism, and social justice. I think Cubans are obliged to find that third solution for Cuba.
Make Cuba Great Again. A neutral Cuba. A Cuba at the head of one of the poles of the multipolar world. A Latin Cuba. A merged, cohesive Cuba focused on a single national project.
I do not believe that Cubans living on the island are happy. Nor are many Cubans living in the United States comfortable. I do not think so. I do believe that Latin Americans, and therefore Cubans, use the economic structures of the United States, but culturally they are very different from Anglo-Saxons. Latin Americans are more communitarian, more identitarian. Therefore, envisioning an identitarian nation can be supported, at least by a portion of the Cuban community in the United States.
But for this, it is imperative not to unite the communist base with the social justice system and the concept of identity. And at the same time, it is necessary to avoid uncritically accepting the liberal approach of the United States.
What country in the world would this Cuba great again resemble?
China. A country that is more or less economically open but still preserves its identity. In my opinion, China is the best example for Cuba today.
So, according to you, Cuba should continue to claim nationalism.
Yes, but we have to avoid the paths of Western nationalism. We have to overcome liberal nationalism, xenophobic nationalism, and racist nationalism. I believe in the power of the people and democracy, but, as I was saying, a national democracy is neither liberal nor dogmatic.
I have developed my ideas in The Fourth Political Theory. I have tried to explain why we must overcome the political states of modernity: liberalism, fascism, and communism. Perhaps this Fourth Political Theory, as a pre-or post-modern form of the social structure, will be helpful in the configuration of that future Cuba.
It will therefore be necessary to analyze and develop a political strategy based on the unification of the Cuban people beyond the Western foundations of modernity, be they liberal or communist.
I understand that the Cuban situation is complex because the country is divided. Still, I believe that the solution is to explore new forms of political thinking, going beyond the ideologies of the last century.
The nationalist thesis you put forward connects with the foundations of the National-Bolshevik Party you founded in 1993 with Eduard Limonov and Yegor Letov. Is any analogy applicable to today’s Cuba?
Today, I don’t think the idea of Bolshevik nationalism was perfect. Still, it was a way of saying that we needed to preserve social justice and link it to the concept of independence, sovereignty, of identity.
That movement is nowadays encompassed under the more specific name of «integral populism.» Neither right nor left: populism as the defense of identity plus sovereignty. Aspects that can unite not only Cubans living on the island but also those living in the United States and other countries.
But importantly, Cuba must also be an integral part of the civilization of Latin America. A civilization that must reorganize itself in the tremendous territorial space it occupies to defend its Ibero-American identity against the rest of the world’s peoples. Latin America has to be an independent pole capable of guaranteeing its sovereignty from the rest of the powers.
Cuba, with its experience, must be at the forefront of Latin America and, at the same time, find its place in it. In my opinion, the formula chosen by the Cubans should not involve accepting social injustice in the style of the United States, but neither should they maintain Marxist concepts in their national ideology any longer. Marxism is a wrong way of understanding society’s nature and historical processes.
This great national project that you propose clashes with reality. Currently, Cuba is a country trapped in a dictatorship, controlled by a military leadership that is undoubtedly not interested in national reunification since this would mean its end.
The dictatorship that exists in Cuba should not be seen as something negative. You can always remove a military dictatorship. That is fortunate for Cubans.
On the other hand, it would be much worse for Cuba if it faced more complex forms of dictatorship. Despite functioning in democratic systems, liberalism is one of the most profound and damaging forms of totalitarianism. Much more so, even, than the dictatorship that Cuba suffers.
And a dictatorship as visible as the Cuban one may not be so bad. I am not saying that it is good. I am saying there is always a way to overthrow a visible dictatorship. However, covert, invisible dictatorships, such as liberalism, are established through the dictatorial rule of the banks and large financial institutions. This type of dictatorship penetrates the hearts and minds of people, destroying them from the inside.
Believe me, the Cuban dictatorship, for sixty years, has had the same effect.
I do not doubt it. But a dictatorship like the one in Cuba, I insist, is not always harmful because it is fragile and visible. After all, it is a military dictatorship and, therefore, can be overthrown. Just as a centralized power over ideology can be removed. But how to do that is a matter of the Cubans. Their national will and their determination to reunify as a nation on both sides of their living space; at that moment, the communist dictatorship will have to disappear. It is inevitable.
Now, to return to the endpoint of the Soviet Union: the end of communism should not mean the end of social justice.
From your position as a geopolitical advisor close to the Kremlin, to what do you attribute that the newly appointed Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has chosen Russia, North Korea, China, Vietnam, and Laos as destinations for his first international tour?
I believe the current government’s only way out is to remain within the context of good relations with China, Russia, North Korea, Vietnam, and the Arab countries. Also, in orbit with countries like Venezuela and Bolivia.
However, this should not confuse the Cuban government with the idea that this correlation involves maintaining communism as an ideological system. That is a mistake. I think that Cuba is obliged to develop a new, totally new way of thinking that produces the national concept, the concept of sovereignty, and the concept of identity.
Following those visits, I believe the new Cuban president may want to find Cuba’s place in the modern context. It is not easy for him because he lacks independence of command and cannot make his own decisions. However, this is my advice: we must be open to alternative and new ideas. The countries visited by the Cuban president represent different modes of existence in the world.
But it is not only Cuba. Russia and China are also looking for an effective way out of Western hegemony. Both nations insist on creating a multipolar world where Cuba can undoubtedly remain a sovereign country.
I think these links are of most interest to the Cuban president and government right now.
What would be Latin America’s role in the multipolar world you envision?
As I was saying, Latin America must become a pole independent of the others: the North American, the European, and the Eurasian. However, Latin America lacks a strategy. Let us think of Brazil today. It is a large and fascinating country. But like Latin America, it is aimless. Bolsonaro is too liberal. He is not a populist; he is a pseudo-populist. Like Latin America, Brazil must overcome liberal right tendencies and cultural Marxism. Reach a synthesis.
Bolsonaro does not represent a valid alternative. Bolsonaro is a right-wing liberal supported by the United States: a form of neo-imperialism underpinned by finance. But the left in Brazil has made many mistakes, making it impossible for them to find another way out.
That is why I believe that Brazil is not an example to imitate. Brazil is now a country in a very critical situation. But as a country, it has a lot of potentials. It has a unique cultural identity, is beautiful, and is centered on its community spirit.
Accepting your thesis and the example of Brazil, we would have to talk about Venezuela. First, Hugo Chávez and then Nicolás Maduro, relying precisely on concepts of identity, national sovereignty, and social justice, far from making Venezuela better, have ruined one of the wealthiest countries in Latin America.
We must defend the theories, the ideas of socialism, and social justice, which are good in themselves, but their application does not always have to be perfect. Characters such as Hugo Chávez or Nicolás Maduro started from good concepts but did not know how to apply those ideas to reality.
You point to the United States as the main enemy of the traditionalist and the illiberal world you propose. However, you have openly favored the speeches and political strategies of Donald Trump and Steve Bannon. What is the reason for this exception?
My support is mainly for Bannon. He is a traditionalist. A traditionalist who has read Evole, Guenon, and Martin Heidegger. And this is not frequent within the American political elite. Bannon, an American politician, has read these authors, which already constitutes an intellectual revolution, a way of overcoming all the limits of American liberalism.
I see in Steve Bannon, above all, the figure of the heroic man, the heroic intellectual capable of overcoming the limits of political correctness. Limits that are very typical of the United States.
On the other hand, Donald Trump, without a doubt, was brilliant in assuming that policy and strategy of criticizing liberals for coming to power, which has shown that the majority of the American people are against their globalist elite. Trump has shown us the inner division of the United States. And that constitutes good news.
During his election campaign, Trump was the spokesman for a message very close to us, those of us who insist on the need to end globalist interventions and occupations. But after coming to power, especially after Bannon’s dismissal, Trump has fallen into the hands of the neoconservatives. And has lost his line; he finds himself in a complex situation because the entire U.S. State is designed based on liberal and globalist postulates, which has not allowed him to carry out his strategy. That structure is what has forced him to dispense with Bannon.
Even so, the current president of the United States retains some positive traits. I do not agree with some specific ideas of Bannon and Trump. Still, I think that the political idealism that the latter represents is much better than the globalism of Hillary Clinton and all that liberal swamp. Trump is much better than his enemies. That’s why I support him.
Steve Bannon is, to me, a fantastic character. I admire the strategist, the intellectual, although I’m afraid I have to disagree, as I was saying, with some of his postulates. That’s the case for his vision of China, or against Iran or Turkey, among other things. Nevertheless, his criticism of modernity, postmodernism and all that globalism confusion are edges that unite me with him. We share an interest in Heidegger and the spiritual tradition of Western Europe, as well as a position against the total decadence represented by today’s liberals and leftist values. Like me, Bannon has favored creating a government between left and right populists in Italy.
Trump is another story, but I believe he gets things right from time to time. For example, the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Syria. That was an excellent decision. In the end, Trump is not as good as we expected, but he is not as bad as he could be.
Since Donald Trump arrived at the White House, relations between Cuba and the U.S. have been drastically modified. What do you think of the current situation? Is Trump doing it right?
Donald Trump is anti-communist, and, as such, he will always consider Cuba an anti-American country. He will necessarily try to insist on a change in the Cuban government’s ideology before considering a dialogue option.
But focus on the example of North Korea. Cuba should take lessons from there. Trump has established a pact, an agreement between two countries until recently in the deadly confrontation, with no peaceful solution. A solution that has nevertheless been achieved. That has to serve as an example for Cuba.
We must be realistic. Donald Trump is a realist. A possible way out of the impasse in Cuba-U.S. relations may have to go through a non-ideological pact: a pact beyond liberalism and communism. An arrangement supported exclusively in the context of realpolitik.
As far as I appreciate, the political power in Cuba denies realism; it denies reality. Hence the lack of agreement. First, Cuba must understand that Trump is a realist, as Putin is a realist, and Xi Jinping is a realist.
Realism in international relations may be the most essential and most effective strategy for Cuba in its ties with Trump, the United States, and other countries.
Edición en inglés: Andrés Jorge González.
© Cover image: Alexandr Dugin.